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I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site, or a nonphilosophical 
site, from which to question philosophy. […] My central question is: from what site or 
non-site (non-lieu) can philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can 
interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner?1 
The present excursus argues for an alignment of ‘embattled adversaries’, namely philosophy and 
literature, and it does that by referring to Derrida`s seminal work, Margins of Philosophy. To 
press further our argument about the alliance of philosophy and literature, we also allude to 
Indian philosophy and the great Indian philosophico-literary epic, the Mahabharata. 
Foundational Indian philosophic texts such as the Vedas and the Upanishads and countless other 
subsequent metaphysical texts were articulated through poetic hymns which are endowed with 
rich literary inflexions. This literary inscape of Indian philosophical texts is ‘in-stressed stressed’ 
and substantiated when Bharatamuni – the ancient author of Natyashastra, the celebrated 
dissertation on Indian drama and dramaturgy – defined the genre of drama as the ‘Fifth Veda’. 
There are four Vedas in Indian philosophy and they are regarded as the foundational core of 
Indian metaphysical tradition and when Bharatamuni elevates drama as the ‘Fifth Veda’ he does 
that on the assumption that drama is born out of the literary seeds ingrained or embedded within 
the Vedas which are primarily known as philosophico-religious texts.2 
All these assumptions on the part of Bharatamuni signify the close kinship or non-duality of 
philosophy and literature and in what follows we take up this coalition of philosophy and 
literature to hint at a possible commonwealth of epistemic possibilities and to do that we bring in 
Derrida’s plea for blurring all genre distinctions between philosophy and philosophy’s Other, i.e. 
literature. Derrida began his Margins of Philosophy (1982) with a call for tympanising 
philosophy and by ‘tympanising’ he means to problematise the traditional definition of 
philosophy. If one elaborates it further, we understand that Derrida frequently used the terms 
‘tympanum’ or ‘tympanon’ to signify the unicity of philosophy or its circumscription within its 
own sovereign ‘ipseity’. The tympanum is the closely guarded border that totalises the regimes 
and sovereign mastery of philosophy. This intransigent border patrolling to retain its unique 
totality has been debunked by Derrida when he talked of de-totalising philosophy or gnawing at 
its border through a ‘limitrophic’ violence, a violence that opens up the conversation with 
philosophy`s Other. Derrida names literature as philosophy`s self-appointed Other, something 
that philosophy has been excluding for many centuries3and Plato’s expulsion of the poet testifies 
that conscripted unicity of philosophy that does not allow its borders to be luxated. 
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida and Richard Kearney, ‘Deconstruction and the Other’, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental 
Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 108. 
2 Sri Babulala Shukla Shastri (ed.), Sri Bharatamuni Pranitam, Sachitram Natyashastram (Baranasi: Chaukhambha 
Sanskrit Sansthan [Reprint edition], 2009) [Chapter 1, Verse 12, page, 4 and Verse 17, page, 6]. 
3 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy translated by Alan Bass (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982). 
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Philosophemes, Derrida complains, generally disallow semiotic egalitarianism and any logic of 
heteronomy is denied the importance it deserves. The margins of philosophy, therefore, generate 
a sovereign ‘envelopment’ and ‘hierarchy’ and Derrida in his Margins of Philosophy asked for 
the blurring of such boundaries, for de-tympanising the imperial borders of philosophy. The 
present paper attempts such de-tympanisation of the boundaries which philosophy erects around 
itself through a deconstructive analysis of the Mahabharata, the Indian foundational text which 
enjoys a unique disciplinary non-site as mentioned in the beginning in the words of Derrida. 
Derrida has previously been linked with Eastern philosophic paradigms and theological 
traditions in several works4 and the present paper continues to explore the possibilities of similar 
alignments between Derridean deconstructive templates and the Mahabharata.  
Let us add here a note for the sake of convenience. Tympanum is something that inhabits the 
border, that activates the border itself, and that keeps the pressure from either side of the border 
in taut balance. Therefore, as and when we tinker with the border of something delimited, we 
actually criticise the act of bordering or limiting that thing. Inhabitation of tympanum is 
inhibition of the bordering process. 
Thus de-limiting is different from delimiting. One can see that this simple act of hyphenation 
makes all the difference, while the difference is actually nothing but a simple act of acting upon 
the limit itself. While denegation of the limit is delimiting, the negation of the same is 
transgressing (and not transcending in the Hegelian sense proper) the limit or ‘aufhebung’ – the 
installation of the ‘limit/passage’. This is precisely what we do when we propose to read the 
Mahabharata through some philosophic optic. We tympanise philosophy to criticise its 
‘envelopment’ into the ‘philosophemes’, and to untie it by ‘de-tympanising its imperial borders’. 
Thus de-limiting could be read as ‘de-tympanising’ or lifting the border, which has all along 
held the order of the philosophical manoeuvring needing now to be tympanised/criticised 
holistically to re-set the border at some point/joint (un)foreseen. Perhaps the Mahabharata may 
constitute some wild and unforeseen frontier at the tympanising juncture of philosophy; and 
hence it can be located in a sort of ‘non-site’, as in spite of being a literary epic in its form and 
content, it is generally considered as a book of philosophy as well. And here we seriously affirm 
the idea of the non-site as the Other of philosophy, in absence of which philosophy would be 
delimited. 
How do we situate or characterise then a text like the Mahabharata? Is it philosophy as 
literature or philosophy and literature both at the same time? We would argue that it perfectly 
adheres to Derrida`s notion of tympanising philosophy, enabling the retainment of the sovereign 
status of philosophy and simultaneously causing the dispersal and dissemination of philosophy’s 
essential singularity of presence. We would imagine and it is commonly established too that the 
Mahabharata in fact is in a way an emanation and expansion/exegesis of the Upanishads and 
related works of Indian philosophy.5 For us, then, the Mahabharata is both philosophy as 
literature as well as philosophy and literature simultaneously. We would try to establish this 
claim by foregrounding on the philosophical theme of cosmography or cosmological time/deep 
                                                 
4 For example Robert Magliola, On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture (Atlanta: Scholar 
Press, 1997); Harold Coward, Derrida and Indian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); 
John D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997) and Jin Y. Park, Buddhisms and Deconstruction (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006). 
5Sitansu S. Chakravarti, Ethics in the Mahabharata: A Philosophical Inquiry for Today (Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers, 2006). 
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time (in our sense that departs from Daniel Lord Smail’s usage, which we will return to at a later 
point of this essay)/kala or what we call thick time as enunciated in the Mahabharata. Time 
comes out here in our schema as the primary philosophical signifier and in the subsequent 
sections we would see how the Mahabharata philosophises on the philosophic category of Time 
and even a cursory glance at the Mahabharatic treatment of Time qualifies it as the elevated 
non-site of both philosophy and literature simultaneously. In the course of the discussion we 
would demonstrate how in explicating the notion of thick time or ‘contretemps’, the 
Mahabharata exemplified Derridean idea of the deconstruction about 2,500 years ago. Since 
Western philosophy is built upon its Greek origins, the distinction of philosophy and literature 
can be traced back to an earlier Western metaphysical origin (Nietzsche’s use of ancient pre-
Socratic chorus may be mentioned in this context. We would return to it, however, at the 
end).But Derrida debunks this genre distinction or devaluation of literature by reading it as the 
site where philosophy can reconsider itself, ‘By looking in the mirror of its other, like for 
instance the mirror of literature, philosophy can start to rethink itself.’ The present paper is 
inspired by this Derridean dis-bordering and such negation of margins and limits allows us to 
brave the hazards of genre distinctions and we intend to read literature and philosophy 
coextensively. As Derrida reminds us, 
If philosophy has always intended, from its point of view, to maintain its relation with the 
nonphilosophical, that is the antiphilosophical, with the practices and knowledge, 
empirical or not, that constitute its other, if it has constituted itself according to this 
purposive entente with its outside, if it has always intended to hear itself speak, in the same 
language, of itself and of something else, can one, strictly speaking, determine a 
nonphilosophical place, a place of exteriority or alterity from which one might still treat of 
philosophy? Is there any ruse not belonging to reason to prevent philosophy from still 
speaking of itself, from borrowing its categories from the logos of the other, by affecting 
itself without delay, on the domestic page of its own tympanum (still the muffled drum, the 
tympanon, the cloth stretched taut in order to take its beating, to amortize impressions, to 
make the types (typoi) resonate, to balance the striking pressure of the typtein, between the 
inside and the outside), with heterogeneous percussion? Can one violently penetrate 
philosophy’s field of listening without its immediately – even pretending in advance, by 
hearing what is said of it, by decoding the statement – making the penetration resonate 
within itself, ... In other words, can one puncture the tympanum of a philosopher and still 
be heard and understood by him?6, 
The penultimate sentence of the above quote, we believe, is highly significant and this is exactly 
what we have been trying to suggest through our reading of Derrida and the Mahabharata. The 
sovereign singularity of philosophy is undone by so called non-philosophic categories and yet 
such non-sites emerge as alien insiders, the Self rubs shoulder with the Other to attain better self-
knowledge. And to adduce a Mahabharatic evidence we may quote from the 2014 book, 
Mahabharata Now that drives home similar points. 
Although philosophers, both in medieval Sanskrit and in modern English, have formulated 
a separate ‘systemic’ Philosophy of Vyasa or Philosophy of the Mahabharata, when we 
approach it with sharp ethical or metaphysical questions, in answer, the book, Bhisma or 
Krshna tells us one or more stories and leaves it at that. Its job seems to be simply to 
                                                 
6 Derrida, Margins x, xix. 
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describe in suggestive detail the actions of different people ... in particular situations. [And 
one may recall, in this context,] Ludwig Wittgenstein’s advice to philosophers, ‘Do not 
explain, just describe’.7 
In these just quoted lines, literature is assigned the role to philosophise and philosophy is seen to 
be musing through literary modes. The philosophers are sometimes lost in their abstracted and 
abstruse vocabulary – though the vocabulary is often generated/played in the concreteness of 
popular life. We invite the Other of philosophy – be it literature for the time being, as Derrida 
says – to offer the concrete stories of life to the philosophers. The present paper therefore, 
attempts the Derridean ‘purposive entente’ with the outside of philosophy, allowing the 
possibility of finding philosophy ‘hear itself speak, in the same language, of itself and of 
something else’ and determining ‘a nonphilosophical place, a place of exteriority or alterity from 
which one might still treat of philosophy.’ We believe our critical Derridean reading of the 
Mahabharata blurs the border zones between philosophy and its alterity or non-philosophical 
places, enabling cross-borderal supplementation through the ‘logos of the Other’. Such a reading 
practice is tantamount to epistemic ‘ambush’ luxating the frontiers of philosophy only to enrich 
it and in the process what comes out in the open is the ‘repressed of philosophy.’  
Consequently, to luxate the philosophical ear, to set the loxos in the logos to work, is to 
avoid frontal and symmetrical protest, opposition in all the forms of anti-, or in any case to 
inscribe antism and overturning, domestic denegation, in an entirely other form of ambush, 
of lokhos, of textual manoeuvres.8 
Will it be said, then, that what resists here is the unthought, the repressed of philosophy?9 
The unconcealment or aletheia of the suppressed, if we recall Heidegger, occasions the 
manifestation of Dasein, an unfurlment that causes multiplicities of flowering – making 
disclosures but always stopping short of truth-claiming as such – or polysemies of significations, 
a task, according to Derrida, that philosophy must aim for. Such a polysemic approach owns up 
the dis-owned outside. 
It may be about this multiplicity that philosophy, being situated, inscribed, and included 
within it, has never been able to reason. Doubtless, philosophy will have sought the 
reassuring and absolute rule, the norm of this polysemia. It will have asked itself if a 
tympanum is natural or constructed, if one does not always come back to the unity of a 
stretched, bordered, framed cloth that watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, and 
negative space, leaving its outside outside, without mark, without opposition, without 
determination, and ready, like matter, the matrix, the khora, to receive and repercuss 
type.10 
Once we allow the suppressed/repressed Other of philosophy its unconcealment, we attain the 
epistemic polysemy or the epistemic egalitarianism that Derrida envisaged. To do that one needs 
to expand one’s traditional optics to envision philosophic lineages even in so called non-
philosophic sites, as did Heidegger by illustrating his notion of ‘unconcealedness’. 
                                                 
7Arindam Chakrabarti and Sibaji Bandyopadhyay (eds.),Mahabharata Now: Narration, Aesthetics, Ethics (New 
Delhi: Routledge, 2014) xxi. 
8 Derrida, Margins x, xix. 
9 Derrida, Margins x, xix. 
10 Derrida, Margins x, xix. (Emphasis ours.) 
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Philosophic exposition of Time in the Mahabharata comes out as that unique reality where 
philosophy and literature coalesce to constitute the common terrain of epistemology where 
philosophy borders onto literature and vice versa. The present paper keeps in mind this dis-
bordering and tries to achieve that by dwelling on Time through a reference to the philosophical 
trajectories of the Mahabharata. In the Mahabharata, we believe, philosophy’s self and the 
Other cohabit. In the subsequent part of the paper, we would go further and would claim that the 
Mahabharata, in spite of being primarily a literary text, belied all genre distinctions and it 
contained thousands of years ago the philosophic grains of deconstruction. Derrida’s 
tympanisation of philosophy seems justified as a symbiotic co-habitation between Derridean 
philosophical deconstruction and literary deconstruction,11 as exemplified in the Mahabharata, 
can open up new philosophic ‘epoches’. 
The philosophic treatment of Time in the Mahabharata prompted us to read this epic through 
a Derridean deconstructive optic to come out with new domains of alternative values. The 
Mahabharata philosophically offers in our deconstructive reading enough grounds of agential 
scaffolding at a time when agencies and subjectivities are denied to us. Here we must remind our 
readers that ours is not a deconstructive reading of the whole of the Mahabharata because such 
an exercise would be impossible to achieve within the span of a paper. We would go for selected 
readings of some episodic portions of the Mahabharata to establish our argument of the dis-
bordering of philosophy and in doing that we explore new significatory horizons of the 
Mahabharata, extracting new contemporary philosophical relevance of the epical text written 
long back. In the process of reading the Mahabharata as a seminal text of adequate 
contemporary metaphysical relevance we also take the liberty to align our epical reading with 
current philosophical positioning of Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben. We would demonstrate 
that the Mahabharata enshrines enough examples of Derridean aporia or the deconstructive 
philosophical contretemps – or counter-time – and it also contains the same interpretive horizon 
of Badiouian notion of ‘subtraction’ or ‘event’ and Agamben’s idea of ‘inoperativity’ – the ideas 
which are in demand to fashion a constitutive temporality of change and subjectivity. In the 
course of the discussion, we would elaborate on these ideas to show that the Mahabharata 
foreshadows contemporary Western philosophical axioms in a significant way. The notions of 
‘inoperativity’ and ‘subtraction’ have a great deal to do with Time as a philosophic category. 
Capitalism induces in us a hegemonic model of homogeneous and linear temporality, a paradigm 
of conformity with one exclusive unidirectional model of Time and Badiouian idea of 
subtraction, Agamben’s theory of inoperativity and Ranciere’s radical doctrine of dissensus call 
for subverting this unidirectional dictum of time. Both of these ideas suggest a complete 
withdrawal from the existing patterns of ideology and call for deconstructing the given temporal 
structures of conformism and collusion. The notion of Time in the Mahabharata subscribes to 
this philosophy of subtraction, or the philosophy of deconstruction. In what follows we take up 
this whole idea of Time and deconstructive philosophy in the Mahabharata. 
Time as a Philosophical Category, Deconstruction and the Mahabharata 
We would now straightaway address the issue of Time in our lives today lived under the 
condition of global capital. At the outset, we would like to clarify that we were inspired in 
                                                 
11Derek Attridge, ‘Introduction: Derrida and the Questioning on Literature’, Acts of Literature by Jacques Derrida 
(New York: Routledge, 1992). 
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initiating this discussion by a Bengali newspaper essay on Time and the Mahabharata written by 
Arindam Chakrabarty written in three parts in Ei Samay, the Bengali newspaper. The essay, 
entitled ‘Samay Je Nei’ [There is no more any time], engaged with the problem of late modern 
paucity of time, wondering in the process the mystery of time-lack in a world surrounded with 
gizmos and gadgets meant to generate surplus free time by reducing human labour. Professor 
Chakrabarty points at our haste, the sick hurry and our subservience to the linear model of 
temporality as induced by capital. On the one hand we have no time to ponder and perhaps we 
have no such times because we do not feel the necessity to ponder at all, allowing us to be 
subjugated by the hegemonic temporal order of capital or the temporal narratives of power that 
by rewarding conformity does not allow any deviation from the given temporal order.  
Here we may also recall Daniel Lord Smail’s notion of ‘Deep History’ and the treatment of 
‘deep time’ in his seminal work, On Deep History and the Brain that induce us to take into 
consideration a different paradigm of time as distinguished from the chronological homogeneity 
of global capital and traditional historiography, a chronology that Western history could not 
trace back before what it calls the dawn of civilization. Let us quote Smail. 
With the sudden and widespread acceptance of geological time in the 1860s, western 
Europe’s chronological certainties came crashing down. Stephen Jay Gould has called the 
discovery of deep time a cosmological revolution of Galilean proportions. Over the course 
of several decades in the mid-nineteenth century, the great historical sciences – geology, 
biology, paleoanthropology – were made or remade as the bottom dropped out of time, 
exposing a nearly endless vista.12 
Smail was thus opposed to the short vista, not unlike the author(s) of the great epic we are 
talking about. Perhaps the hurried and harried nature of Western civilisation has got something 
to do with the unnecessarily myopic vision of the time purveyors living there, the vision that 
attempted another kind of centrism other than Eurocentric and geocentric ones. But this time the 
centric configuration is delimiting more on the line of time than on space. The virulent form of 
anthropocentrism is perhaps rooted in this crippling short vision too. Smail holds that this lack of 
longue duree replicates the Christian mythological range of time which is no more than merely 
about five thousand years since the idyllic days of the Garden of Eden. Smail thus claims that 
Western historiography suffered from the ‘grip of sacred history’.13 
On the other hand, Indian epics and mythologies are full of astronomical numbers. Although 
the main story of the Mahabharata centring on the War of Kurukshetra corresponds to the 
temporal order not out of human proportions, the supplementary stories often make mind-
boggling claims about durations. The curses, austerities, penances, oaths etc. would more often 
than not take hundreds and even thousands of years. Now if we are permitted to look at a 
different mythological register, we may note that the measure of time like Kalpa is also huge and 
Brobdingnagian. Kalpa is one diurnal and nocturnal cycle of Brahma, which equals to twice 
4,320,000,000 years!14 
Perhaps the traditional Indian mind – of course we are running the risk of making a hasty 
generalisation – generally likes to bask in time as an entity to live through, enjoying the same by 
living substantially within it. Time is ‘thick’ for them insofar as it is an end in itself. The 
                                                 
12Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 1. 
13Smail 1. 
14Jnanendra Mohan Das, Bangala Bhashar Abhidhan (Dwitiya Bhag) [Bengali version of Dictionary of the Bengali 
Language,Volume 2] (Kolkata: Sahitya Samsad, 1986) 460. 
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opposite is to treat time as too ‘thin’ to be felt, and to employ it as an instrument – i.e. the means 
to ‘other’ ends. And today’s global capital knows the best what could be those ‘other ends’ could 
be. This may lead us straightaway to the ideas of ‘reflexive modernity’, ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ etc. – enunciated by Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash among others – which would be 
instructive for our purpose of understanding the time-hurry nature of our life today.  
Reflexivity may refer to several things in social sciences which are not always too close to 
one another. In addition to the old philosophical import of ‘seeing with added eye’ or its widely 
known current meaning of ‘self-referentiality’, or the ‘systematic reflection on the unconscious 
presuppositions’ or the continuous feedback of social scientific knowledge to the commonsense, 
it is also even somewhat symptomatic of hanging in the midway of the conscious and the 
unconscious.15 We are mostly interested in a sense close to the latter one but with more specific 
shade of acting on the spur of automatic reflex as opposed to basing on well-thought reflection, 
so to speak, the hall mark of modernity.  
Beck … often works from the contrast of ‘reflex’ with ‘reflection’. Reflexive he argues has 
more to do with reflex than reflection. Reflexes are indeterminate ... Reflexes cope with a 
world of speed and quick decision-making ... Beck [however] often omits to say that [the 
‘contemporary’] individual must choose fast, must – as in reflex – make quick decisions.16  
This ‘Reflexive modernity’ and we, i.e. its children, are left, on the other hand, with no time to 
reflect on what to act upon or act along or react to, nor having any need to do any reflecting 
nevertheless, for to reflect is to relate, to relate is to relay, to relay is (to delay and) to relax, to 
relax is (to wax and) waste – i.e. wasting away of energy, resource and most importantly, time, 
which is money itself through the operation of capitalistic logic of the interest rate and through 
the functioning of capitalism as a system that must not be dislocated, deconstructed, subtracted 
or ‘inoperated’ in the interest of the upward spiralling of the interest rate. And, on a different but 
related meta-linguistic detour, to reflect is to ponder, and to ponder is to wonder, to wonder is to 
wander, and, then, to wander is to squander i.e. to waste, (and thus we may opt to be delivered 
onto the former route, or we may decide to experiment with a different paradigmatic register that 
could lead) even to blunder, to subvert, or at least to criticise and, in Derridean terms, to 
tympanise.  
Time therefore is crucial in our philosophic argumentative frame. The ruling ideology of the 
temporal is crucial to understand and unravel the contours of our current existential condition 
and it is also instructive for any possible way of emancipation. And a Derridean reading of the 
Mahabharata dwells on a critique of this ideology of time. One primary reason to do such a 
reading is to establish again the point we began with, namely the equivalence of philosophy and 
literature. Time has been a very important philosophic category since Heraclitus’ deliberation of 
Time and flux, and the Mahabharata does the same by philosophising on it. 
We intend to focus on the politics of time that does not allow any room for ‘aporetic time’ or 
the moment of Derridean aporia or deadlock which could well be, to employ another Derridean 
term, ‘contretemp’. The idea of aporia brings us to the Derridean logic of differance and 
deferment or deconstruction and we would argue that the philosophic notion of aporia also helps 
                                                 
15Ulrich Beck et al, The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social 
Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) 174-178. 
16
 Scott Lash, ‘Foreword’, Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political 
Consequences by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (London: Sage, 2002) ix. (Emphasis in original).  
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us in arriving at the possibility of ‘time out of joint’ or the enjambment of time. We would 
imagine that the logic of systemic status quo thrives on the deterministic logic of linear 
temporality that imprisons the subject into the closure of linearity or into the panopticon of time. 
In the hands of power, time is a disciplining tool and a punishing or controlling apparatus of 
hegemony.  
Consequently, the hegemonic narratives of our times have valorised terms and concept 
metaphors such as ‘multi-tasking’, ‘workaholic’, ‘multi-skilled’ etc. The chariot of time is 
always at our back and we are constantly having a phase of ultra-involvement in their time or 
what we call ‘thin time’, a state of temporality that ousts the possibility of ‘soul time’ or ‘thick 
time’ or our time and the ever diminishing state of thick time has made us time-paupers. 
Arindam Chakrabarty in his essay on Mahabharata and Time has exactly elaborated on this 
condition of time-pauperity and he referred to the Mahabharata to explain how we need to 
nurture more our moments of thick time to tympanise – or criticise – the hegemony of time-lack 
under the condition of global capital. So this act of tympanising the hegemony of time-lack 
aligns us both to the philosophic task of attaining soul time in moments of Time-pauperisation 
and also to the primary Derridean task of ambushing the border between philosophy and 
literature because very soon we would see how the Mahabharata through its deep 
philosophisation of Time belies all attempts for limiting the margins of philosophy. We should 
now mention Clifford Geertz, whose development of the idea of ‘thick description’, while 
writing ‘an interpretive theory of culture’, might have some tacit influence on us, as we coin the 
notions of thick time (or soul time/our time) and the thin time (or impoverished time/their 
time).17 
As stated earlier, in this article we propose to hold time as our problematic, for we feel 
inclined to re-examine a host of old and new philosophical questions about time and ethics. And 
we have decided to look into the body of the great Indian epic/ (philosophico-epic?) of the 
Mahabharata in particular to obtain some alternative temporalities, since therein we recurrently 
come across epical characters like Vyasa and Ganesa as a couple, Bhisma, or Arjuna, or 
Chirakari, or Ahalya, who, sometime, putatively, procrastinate and postpone, as well as 
deconstruct issues, to explore the possibilities of justice despite, at times, the apparent 
impossibility of the same. And in those classical textual cases we confront different kinds of 
time scaling too that lie juxtaposed alongside each other, or are ‘folded’ into, or invaginating, 
one another as in the event of millennial waiting of Ahalya; or in the instance of the sudden 
postponement of the War of Kurukshetra by the qualms raised in the then apathetic mind of 
Arjuna eventually causing the hundreds of verses of the Gita to be produced meanwhile. Both 
the incidents – one concerning Ahalya and the other, Arjuna – are actually ‘folded’ within a sort 
of a primary and overt time frame, which is apparently more inclusive but scalar – and therefore 
impoverished and emaciated – than these dramatic versions of secondary and covert time scales 
that, purportedly, make the notion of time itself nonlinear, if not non-chronological, and should 
we say, contretemporal?18 To our mind, these manners of ‘subtraction’ from the spectre of 
compulsive progress by employing the strategy of deferment by the above dramatis personae, 
and those evidences of, say, ‘rhizomic’ multiplication of the framing of time by the storytellers 
of the previously mentioned early foundational text – we mean the Mahabharata – with their 
                                                 
17Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 3-30. 
18 Jacques Derrida, ‘Aphorism Countertime’, trans. Nicholas Royle, Acts of Literature edited by Derek Attridge 
(London: Routledge, 1992) 414-433. 
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pre-empting of the discipline provided by the singularity of the (presumed) modernist ‘arrow of 
time’, might tempt one to scrap or at least to rethink the ideas around the linearity and integrity 
of chronological time. In what follows we continue this discussion with reference to the 
Mahabharata and Derrida. 
Thick Time, Deferred Time and the Contretemporal Habitus and a Derridean Reading of 
the Mahabharata 
The hegemonic temporal order of global capital induces us into what we call a thin and 
impoverished temporality and subservience to the latter, denying the possibility of a thick time of 
variance and deviance as well as resistant subjectivity. Borrowing the deconstructive dharma of 
Chirakari, a character from the Mahabharata, we would presently argue for a paradigm of 
deferred time or ‘contretemp’ as counter-time. The liberal capitalist mode as the master signifier 
calls for ‘agonistic’ reading practices as possible vehicles for counter-hegemony and 
‘subtraction’ from the reigning (mono-) temporal (World-) order. As the entire socius is a 
continuous sign chain, where the possibility of action lies in the dynamics of the disruption of 
this chain to construct a grammar of radical supplementarity and ‘differance’, our everyday 
dimension of linear time as induced by global capital can be disrupted by what Badiou calls 
‘events’; and when an event occurs time is ‘out of joint’. It represents both an invitation to a full 
appreciation of our ‘being’ and a disruption of our cosy perception of the linear time, an 
interruption to the normal temporal order, a radical ‘breaching’ open of time – i.e. a deliverance 
to a j juncture wherein the minor beings of designated time-space like subjugating/subjugated 
being or examining/examined being open up or unfold unto the ‘khoratic’, ‘rhizomic’ as well as 
golemic substance and/or substrate of being-and-scalar-time on the one hand, and nonbeing-and-
polysemic-time on the other. This is perhaps a ‘luxatic’ turn out of the ‘khoratic’ and ‘tympanic’ 
diaphragm or the hymenal membrane: a non-‘posit’-able but immensely posibilising ‘liminal’ 
place of nonbeing/ being that blurs the inside and the outside, the pressing and the pressed, the 
separator and the medium, the protector and the invocator and the desiring and the desired –or 
which could be generalised/ reduced to agency and structure both or either agency or structure. 
This may also stand as the background and foreground of the agential. And this is standing aside 
while inhabiting (on) the sideline, staying apart while remaining a part, something alike a 
totalising philosophical manoeuvring from/with a de-totalising non-philosophical 
position/posture. The ‘margins of philosophy’ are the lines wherein swarm the infinite moments 
of the life and the world, lives that are the worlds – the ‘lifeworlds’. The stories of the imagined 
but concrete persona or the narratives that constitute the literature are the only fully fledged 
registers that we really have about these lifeworlds. But that concreteness thrives in what 
Bergson calls ‘homogeneous time’ – a spatialised species of time – a philosophical concept of 
time, nevertheless, that has long before percolated into the sphere of the mundane with the aids 
of common measuring rods – old and new – of time. But, at the depth of our conscious being, the 
‘animal therefore I am’ cannot but feel the ‘duree’ and duree alone – yet another philosophically 
abstracted notion proposed by Bergson – which is the extreme concrete version of 
experienced/sensed time.19 Now, literature is (his)tory in every spatiotemporal detail where s/he 
is a whole being straddling the duree only. And to augur singular and holistic philosophy during 
and from them is therefore always tympanic –an ‘epoche’ or event which is critically distant yet 
sensitisingly merging with the singular literatures that could never be pluralised without 
                                                 
19Alfred Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970) 60-62. 
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damaging their individuality. And there are sciences of all creeds that busy themselves doing the 
pluralising, to the point of generalising, work which are instantiations of totalism of the ‘middle 
range’. Thus we are given literature, which is, perforce, at the beginning of all stories. And 
perhaps Schopenhauer anticipated something like it much earlier than us and we will return to it 
later.20 In the Mahabharata we find the flourishing of the very foundational substance that go 
into the making of the philosophy of a civilisation. The Mahabharata war stands at one of the 
significant junctures of ‘time-reckoning’ too, if we follow the opinion of the Indian historian, 
Romila Thapar, who claims that the post Mahabharata ‘dynastic time ... takes the functional 
form of historical chronology’. She also mentions Manu(s) and their ‘large time cycles’, the 
seers representing eons of Indian mythological time.21 Sometimes these eons are separated (or 
blurred, as water is a liquid that has great connecting/dissolving quality?) by the great tide of 
water – the Mahaplabana or the great inundation22 – that dissolves everything at a massive 
‘khoratic’ and ‘evental’ moment. Thus, as the name itself suggests, the Mahabharata stands at a 
confluence – the confluence where cosmic eternity of the mythical meets the quotidian everyday 
of the chronological-historical. 
And, from the stories of great demise we may suddenly revert to a story which begins afresh, 
time and again. Can’t we see that this epic is always a told story! A story that begins with Souti, 
an epical character telling the hermits – assembled in the annual sacrificial rite of the great sage, 
Sounaka – about what Vaisampayana has narrated at the King Janamejay’s snake sacrifice rite 
from the great epical text composed by Vyasa by telling Ganesa to write them down23– a kind of 
a series of temporal homunculi always starting afresh. Thus the beginnings falter not unlike our 
Arjuna stumbling before the Kurukshetra war in the Gita, or Ganesa making Vyasa pause even 
before the scripting of the story commences. We will elaborate on this theme in a later section. 
But now let us turn to Derrida again and, viewed in Derridean optics, how can we forget that all 
these relaying narrators are actually pouring things onto the ears of their listeners thus 
occasioning a series of tympanising phases only to be followed by the subsequent ones?  
And now for Derrida, ‘it takes time to do without time’ and any interaction involves a 
‘contretemporal habitus’, an untimely habitus, and a deferred time to deconstruct the hegemon. 
We argue that some instances in the Mahabharata can provide such contretemporal immanence, 
as described by Derrida. And one of them is the befuddling story of Chirakari, whose name 
means, literally, the one who does a task taking time without end. 
Chirakari – the Literary Derrida – and the Mythical Parents of Deconstruction 
In the Mahabharata we meet Chirakari, the son of Rishi Goutama and Ahalya. To us, i.e. to the 
inhabitants of our time, Chirakari is an enigma. Always keen to do justice to his good name, he 
remained a habitual procrastinator. He always gave considerable, if not incredibly immense, 
thought before embarking on some action. Once Indra, the king of the heaven, came to the 
hermitage of Goutama, the sage, and managed to deceive Ahalya by assuming Goutama’s 
persona to get into a sexual liaison with her. Meditating, Goutama came to know about the 
                                                 
20Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Time Incorporated, 1962). 
21Romila Thapar, Time as the Metaphor of History (Reprinted in History and Beyond) (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 30-1. 
22Thapar 30-1. 
23Rajsekhar Basu, Mahabharata (Bengali version) (Kolkata: M.C. Sarkar, 1356 Bengali Era [1960-61]) 1-2. 
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adultery and with fury he instructed his son, Chirakari, to kill his mother with a sword. Having 
decreed such a cruel thing, he immediately left for the forest. 
Now Chirakari got into a session of intense thinking. To kill or not to kill his mother – the 
kind of a dilemma that Hamlet had to bear! On the one hand, it is a serious sin according to 
ancient religious injunctions not to carry out one’s father’s order. On the other, it is no less an 
offence to commit the sin of matricide. Hence, Chirakari went on deliberating and pondering 
over various aspects of his act and the more Chirakari thought about all these, the more he got 
deeper and deeper into the problematic of the situation, which, as far as his mode of life is 
concerned, could hardly be resolved with any haste. Thus, in the end, Chirakari experienced a 
very great dilemma only, and he did so in the context of a case where such dilemmas are quite 
natural. Chirakari was brought to a point where one may either decide to abide by the severe rule 
of terror issued by the father and commit the matricide, or else may flout this fatherly order in 
order to remain on the side of life and that of the life of none but his mother. With this 
fatefulness writ large, Chirakari could do nothing but giving the case at hand more than 
sufficient thought. 
Meanwhile, however, Goutama’s fury subsided, and the moment that happened he started to 
run back to his hermitage. All the way he wondered whether Chirakari would be good enough to 
act according to his name today and defer the killing of his mother. Finally, when Chirakari put 
down his arms at the feet of his father, expressing his perplexity about the value of this killing, 
the no more regretful – yet guilty – father adored and praised his son for being so discreet about 
matters of grave importance.24 And we are also advised that the benevolent deeds should be 
expedited, if possible; but the menacing things may be postponed for an indefinite time 
(‘Subhasyashighran, asubhasyakalaharanam’). Sometimes even a minimal taking of time or 
postponement to act might save hundreds of lives. 
This essentially ‘deconstructive’ episode appears in the epic called the Mahabharata about 
2,500 years ago. And in the same epic we also find the maxim – to define is to close.25 And we 
have already seen that capitalist modernity leaves a very little time for us to rethink the extant 
definitions. 
However, to ‘luxate’ the things at our disposal, let us draw towards the close this 
‘Mahabharatic’ essay with one authentic genesis story – the genesis of the Mahabharata itself –
to which we have already alluded. We will see here that the paradigmatic depth of the 
hermeneutic and the unending nature of the circles of their meaning, the polysemic and the 
polyvocal Slokas (verses) of the Mahabharata would always engender opportunity for 
deconstruction. Even what happens at the surface finally leads us to delve into the deeper layers 
– and that is exactly what happens during the too ‘literal’ ‘tug of war’ between Vyasa (the author 
of Mahabharata) and Ganesa (the mythological scripter or stenographer of Mahabharata). The 
latter imposed a condition on Vyasa that he would agree on the act of composition only if Vyasa 
dictates the verses non-stop. This imposition was settled by Vyasa in a clever way and both of 
them eventually came to a negotiating point where Ganesa would not have to wait for the 
subsequent instalment of the verses, but only on the stringent condition of his always already 
going through all the layers of ‘differantial’ meanings before writing them onto the surface. 
                                                 
24Kaliprasanna Singha, Mahabhatrata [5th Volume](Bengali version) (Kolkata: Saksharata Prakasan, 1976) 258-
260. 
25Chaturvedi Badrinath, The Mahabharata: An Inquiry into the Human Condition (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 
2007). 
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Thus Ganesa himself turns into a veritable ‘tympan’ who first understands on his own, letting the 
meanings have impressions on him; then and only then would he make the writing business to 
push or press the storyline for the posterity to listen to and, subsequently, to communicate 
further. The lurking layers of the absent other meanings are all summoned to present themselves 
at the call of this mythical parents of deconstruction – Vyasa and Ganesa –who dismantle the 
univocal speech out of hand and amortise it into an ever-widening series of deconstructed 
meanings with the aid of (and the respite of) the act of writing. A foundational literary text thus 
anticipates a philosophy which would take its birth millennia apart and continents afar. Can we 
call it a Derridean ‘double session’? This also has a Bakhtinian dialogic trace as the text contains 
multiple contesting undertones of meanings, enabling heteroglossic interpretations, thereby 
deconstructing the univocity of meaning. 
We have just seen in the event of the imposition of the condition by Vyasa to Ganesa that 
script-writer must not write anything without understanding the meaning as polysemically and 
thickly as possible. This, however, emboldens the present authors to return to their proposed idea 
of the ‘thick time’, which is now all the more necessary with our Ganesa, for he needs hours to 
meet what has been required of him. Ganesa compels Vyasa to think as fast as he would finish 
writing; but Vyasa, the unlettered composer, could make the table turn onto his erudite 
accomplice by posing his challenge to the latter by inviting him in an unending hermeneutic 
exercise before doing the mechanical part of the scripting job. May we now move to another 
Derridean idea – the idea of the existence of a variety of texts even preceding, or existing 
alongside, any of the scripted form of languages? We are actually hinting at the possibility of 
prevalence of a veritable ‘text’ anterior to what Ganesa has written, otherwise how could we 
explain the possibility of ‘many levels of meaning.26 But where was that ‘text’ actually located? 
Was it housed in the body of the verses that were being composed by Vyasa only at the hour of 
its scripting, or they were full of intertextual layers, while these intertextual imports were 
rendered by the ensemble of pre-Mahabharatic tales from the Vedas and the Upanishads on the 
one hand, and the etymological and other sources of meaning on the other? And drifting toward 
some other direction, we may think of the differential renditions of the Mahabharata that were 
formed in various parts of India in different historical eras; so much so that prestigious 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in India had to think of writing a ‘critical edition’ of the 
great epic. Can we not take any of them as one more ‘tympanised’ version of the Mahabharata? 
The Mahabharata is thus always a medium as well as the mediated, always in the process of 
being formed, be in the mythical versions of multiple sessions of its being retold and 
reinterpreted, be it by Souti or Vaishayampana in their role of narrator or by Ganesa in his 
sessions of deep writing, or during the innumerable sessions of their narration amongst the 
populace. 
Finally, to return to the issue of time, we can very well understand that Vyasa has little worry 
about time crunch. With each verse he breaks open some more time to think, now Ganesa too, 
having joined him and always taking a long time to understand Vyasa, they are literally 
‘subtracting’ them from the mundane. This ‘eventality’ of ‘subtracting’ oneself a la Badiou is 
true for Chirakari as well as Arjuna in the war front too. Subtracting is related to the idea of 
morality in the form of duty and justice. With inventing, or breaking open, extra time each time a 
dilemma occurs, the epical (Chirakari and Arjuna) and meta-epical (e.g. Vyasa and Ganesa) 
characters are subtracting themselves from the linear and inexorable time with which we are 
                                                 
26Badrinath 2. 
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almost obsessed as the only possible version of time. In the acts of contemplative Chirakari or 
Arjun, do we not find a kind of an attempt to make the impossible possible – a refrain in the later 
Derrida’s repertoire of philosophical vocabulary? And to do so one always needs time. Thus 
time is the measure of criticism itself. An original act is always expensive in its extent of 
wastage of time. And an original act is always a critique of what has been handed down to the 
present. Thus the Chirakaris cannot but raise questions that take time to be resolved. And who 
tell us that we really need to hurry? If they are our respected elders, as Goutama was to 
Chirakari, we only need to face them with our ‘argumentative mind’ awake, as Chirakari did 
despite Goutama’s clear order to carry out an inordinately cruel job. 
Then, what do all these have to do with the tympanised khoratic zone of literature and 
philosophy? And how does our critique of temporality help in turning philosophy to literature 
and vice versa? Those will constitute our conclusion that would, of necessity, stop short of 
concluding themselves, for to conclude is to put closure, to stop tympanising, which might be the 
most unmahabharatic act. We really never know how to conclude the Mahabharata or 
conclude/infer anything from its text? 
Conclusion 
There are at least three senses of time in the Mahabharata.27 To our mind, these senses can be 
mined to get to the essence of our ‘tympan’ of philosophy that the Mahabharata is. Let us quote: 
There is, moreover, the question of history and meaning. This is explored in the 
Mahabharata at many different levels. Kala, ‘time’, in which everything originates and is 
destroyed, the determining factor of one’s destiny, is not the historical ‘time’. Neither is it 
the ‘time’ that is physically measured. It is a force, say, akin to God, in which originates all 
that is and also all that is not. It is the ultimate cause of all happenings at another level, 
kala, ‘time’, is the measure of appropriateness. It is combined with desha and patra, 
‘place’ and ‘the person concerned’. These three, desh, kala and patra, that is, ‘the proper 
place’, ‘the proper time’, and ‘the proper person’, determine the appropriateness of an act 
and thus its meaning. In other words, they determine the context, in which a person lives 
and has his, or her, being; and meaning lies in context. At still another level, ‘time’ as 
history is examined as giving substance to one’s life. The three attributes of history of, the 
‘past’, the ‘present’ and the ‘future’, and one’s relationship with them as one’s relationship 
with oneself, constitutes one of the subjects of the inquiry into the human condition. At the 
same time, acknowledging the power of kala in different forms, the Mahabharata raises 
the question: am I my history alone? Is ‘context’ all that there is to ‘meaning’? And with 
that, the inquiry moves on to a different plane – that of the relationship between history 
and its transcending, between the eternal and transient, nitya and anitya, as the substance 
of life and relationship. All these questions are to be found throughout the Mahabharata.28 
 
We will shortly return to the first and third of these senses. Let us now add something on certain 
events of the Mahabharata where the notions of time and its deconstructive value can be 
intriguing. Perhaps this would help us to understand not only the ‘aporetic’ time, but how the 
Mahabharata ‘tympanises’ or ‘dis-borders’ the divide between philosophy and literature. The 
                                                 
27Badrinath 9. 
28Badrinath 9. 
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Mahabharata narrates the battle of Kurukshetra in a great way and this mega encounter has been 
portrayed in the epic as the battle of all battles that would decide the fate of humanity. At the 
time of the commencement of War of Kurukshetra, Arjuna, one of the protagonists, felt 
devastated at the possibility of this gory battle that would cause, perforce, the death (or murder?) 
of his closest relatives and relations who are now more or less distributed between either of the 
confronting sides. Krishna, the Avatar as well as the divine charioteer of the valiant Arjuna, then 
began to sermonise Arjuna about the philosophy of karma or righteous action and all his 
philosophisation form the great text of the Bhagavadgita that contains hundreds (actually 701) of 
Slokas. During this session, Krishna had to demonstrate his Visvsaroop (theophany) too, right 
inside the battlefield before the eyes of thousands of warriors who were eager to flaunt their 
belligerence. And this epiphanic episode cannot but take hours to happen. However, apparently, 
the whole thing took place in a kind of time-and-space warp, within which a charioteer turns into 
the prime-mover, leading from the front quite literally. Now it is naïve to measure these mythical 
intervals realistically. And in the Mahabharata itself there are ample evidences of such time-
outs. But one may note the specialty of the occasion. The most climactic situation turns against 
itself, gets dilated – if not ‘luxated’ – and Arjuna, the man chosen by Krishna – the Avatar – for 
assisting him in his divine mission of destroying the evil forces on earth, is then trembling with 
compunction. Thence follows an argument that suspends everything usual in the warfront. What 
a theatre to stage a deconstructive act!  
After Arjuna, let us now return to Chirakari, the other Mahabharatic character whom we have 
already talked about extensively in our essay. He is an active deconstructionist who breaks open 
the linear and scalar time to get inside of what we call thick time or soul time. There, and then, 
he keeps on meditating, and that too not unlike a philosopher, over Cartesian sorts of rights-and-
wrongs of either side of his sage-father’s order to kill his mother for her presumed involvement 
in an illicit sexual encounter with a lecherous god. His meditations, however, invent a kind of a 
third way, and he thereby differs and defers from taking any of the alternative positions without 
testing them by rigorous reasoning that could challenge any simple-minded Cartesianism; for, he 
never came to the closure of a conclusion about the right and wrong of the order, but suspended 
the same all along, for that could cause an irretrievable loss. Finally we may refer back to the 
dilemma that our divine stenographer, Ganesa, encountered before the counter-condition of 
Vyasa. This last instance belongs to a different category, since Arjuna and Chirakari were made 
‘inoperative’ while harbouring fateful doubts about what to do or not to do amidst their own 
biographical context, while Ganesa was obliged to engage himself with differantial meanings 
before materialising the ‘text’ by writing it down.  
With the selection of a very few cases from the Mahabharata that seemed really pertinent for 
our purpose, we do not claim to have made an all-round experiment with the epic of Derridean 
deconstruction, but we have attempted to spend a ‘tympanising’/criticising session on the epic, 
keeping in mind how these deliberations can make a case for dis-bordering of philosophy and 
literature on the one hand, and, on the other, could attempt a critique of temporality by 
challenging a kind of an un-philosophical drift of the contemporary times that has flattened the 
thickness of our reasoning and turned compassionate time into thoughtless haste of time-
craziness. And, as we have just mentioned, herein we have to delve into rethinking the thing one 
may call ‘philosophy in literature’. Perhaps the genre distinction is never as acute as in the 
modern times, the times when the linear time has penetrated literature through ‘realism’ among 
the other things. 
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The moment Arjuna and Chirakari start thinking, they ‘subtract’ themselves from the flow of 
real, ‘historical’ time. These ‘events’ are some of the most philosophical moments of the epic, 
with their moral, logical as well as ontological interrogations. On the other hand, our epical 
stenographer, Ganesa, too has been left with very little scope to betray much reverence to the 
univocal symbolism that realist literature allows. He acts as a khoratic context where 
polychromatic possibilities of alternative realities may flourish in the mythological literature that 
approaches philosophy of deconstruction. Under these circumstances, philosophy and literature 
may transgress each other, this transgression being directly associated with what Derrida calls 
(and we have elaborated substantially) ‘tympanising’. Now ‘time’ is an extension of ‘being’, for 
being cannot but exist in time. But, with the enthronement of global and universally applicable 
historical time our individual beings and their soul times get decimated as well as emaciated. 
The Mahabharata is inspirational for us for it offers us to live with a sense of time that is akin 
to Mahakala on the one hand without throwing us away from the more homely historical time 
we are ensconced in. Human beings cannot but live in a ‘joint’ of different kinds of time –
Mahakala on the one hand, which is religico-philosophical, and biographically sliced historical 
time of past, present and future on the other, taking the first and the third senses of the 
Mahabharatic time, as stated by Badrinath (see above). The transgression between them is 
impossibility when things are considered too realistically, but with the aid of a mythological text 
we very often suspend our wide-awakeness, so to speak, and subject ourselves in an experience 
of a déjà vu with our penchant for khoratic return to the wombs of our many beings. We hold 
that the multiplexity of the Mahabharatic time offers the opportunity for ‘eternal return’ quite 
effectively. This transgression is akin to the Derridean Aufhebung/Aufheben, which is, as we 
have said in the beginning, ‘[l]imit/passage’, and which ‘relaunch[es] in every sense the reading 
of the Hegelian Aufhebung, eventually beyond ... Hegel’,29 that is, as we understand, beyond his 
notion of transcendence. We have the clue that Derrida likes the idea of transgression, but not 
transcendence that does not pay heed to the mediating tympan. And without that bridging thing 
one cannot be its Other any more. For Hegel, Othering is a relation between thesis and 
antithesis, and their resolution is synthesis – a closure, and a transcendence to a new site 
altogether. Thus, in Hegelian Aufhebung there is scarcely any mediator, only abolition, 
preservation and transcendence, while preservation hardly functioning as an important middle 
term, or an active bridge, from what has been abolished, from his function of a philosopher to 
that of a man of literature. And Attridge hints that Derrida’s oeuvre is a testimony to that too. 
Does not the ‘tympan’ help the philosopher to hear what he himself says, as Derrida himself 
alludes to in ‘Tympan’? Now, moving from one tympan to another, does not literature 
‘unconceal’ the philosophemes, which hide the ‘worlded’ nature of the everyday life? Where can 
we find the ‘non-site’ of philosophy if not at the (non-)place where it visits much more than 
occasionally as if to transgress itself? And when the Mahabharatic Kala in the first sense 
includes everything what has been (‘originated’) there and what has not been (‘originated’) 
there, as we have read above in Badrinath’s rendition.30 Can we not claim that this mighty 
‘khoratic’ Time is not only deeply philosophical, but even transgressive in principle? And would 
it be irrelevant here to get back to Nietzsche and his compliments for the Dionysian cult and the 
chorus (Khora and chorus are of the same etymological origin) of the pre-Socratic Greek 
dramas, which – we mean the latter – had association to the pre-Socratic philosophy. We have 
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mentioned the ancient Indian Natyashastra of Bharatamuni and its relation with philosophy 
earlier in this article. Schopenhauer too had a deep regard for art (and literature is a form of 
artistic production) as depicting a universal in terms of an imaginary particulars.31 Thus we have 
the Other of philosophy always lying alongside philosophy itself. The Mahabharata is one 
massive paradigm of this juxtaposition.  
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